The Doctrine of Potential Undetached Parts (DPUP) says that proper undetached parts (i.e., parts that are connected to other parts of the same whole) are not actual entities. They are merely potential entities, entities which would exist if they were detached from the rest of the wholes to which they belong.
with the wholes to which they belong. A hand or a tail only exist in potentia, and the only way to bring them to actual life is to detach them from the rest of the body.
One of the advantages of this doctrine is that it offers a simple solution to a classic puzzle that arises in connection with the mereology of continuants. At t, Tibbles is a happy cat with a nice tail. But then comes an accident in which Tibbles loses its tail (the tail may or may not get destroyed in the accident), and at t' poor Tibbles is a tailless cat. Call the tail "Tail", and the rest "Tib". The puzzle is that the following four propositions are all prima facie true:
1. Tib at t ≠ Tibbles at t (one is a proper part of the other) 2. Tib at t = Tib at t' (Tib is not affected by whatever happens to Tail) 3. Tibbles at t = Tibbles at t' (Tibbles survives the loss of Tail) 4. Tibbles at t' = Tib at t' (now both have the same parts)
Yet 2-4 jointly imply the negation of 1 by transitivity of identity, so something must go. Since 1 is true by Leibniz's law (Tib and Tibbles have different shapes), it is argued that one must give up one among 2, 3, and 4. To give up 4 is to abandon both the principle of mereological extensionality, to the effect that two distinct entities cannot have exactly the same parts, and the traditional identity criterion according to which two distinct material bodies cannot occupy the same spatial region at the same time. To give up 3 leads eventually to a form of mereological essentialism: the removal of a part affects the identity of the whole. So if neither of these ways out is found palatable, the only option is to give up 2. But this seems to imply an even stronger form of essentialism (a form of topological essentialism, to give it a name) to the effect that the removal of a part affects the identity of another, adjacent but mereologically disjoint part. And if one worries about mereological essentialism, why should one accept that?
The first option-giving up 4-is the preferred way in the literature. See e.g. Wiggins (1979) , Simons (1987) , and Lowe (1989) for a rebuttal of extensionality, Wiggins (1968) , Hirsch (1982) , and Thomson (1983) for a rejection of the principle of exclusive location, and Doepke (1982) for a rejection of both. The second option-mereological essentialism-is Chisholm's preferred strategy (1973) . The option labeled topological essentialism has not to my knowledge been explicitly defended, and most authors tend to reject it as utterly inadmissible. Of course, one remaining option would be to accept all of It is here that DPUP offers a solution. For a defender of DPUP, 2 is indeed false. But it is false because Tib (like Tail) only comes into existence at t'. Tib does not exist at t, so it cannot be the same thing as Tib at t'. No matter how tolerant one is with regard to the survival of entities through change, nothing can survive the change from non-existence (potentiality) to existence (actuality).
3 (One may, if one wants, think of this account as implementing a form of topological essentialism after all. For it is precisely the transition from attached to detached that marks the relevant difference-and contact is a topological property. Even so, for a defender of DPUP this is a weak form of essentialism. To exist is to have an actual boundary; that is an essential property of all objects. But what boundary goes with what object, or what parts prevent other parts from having a complete boundary, these are questions that DPUP leaves open. In particular, the identity of a whole need not be affected by a boundary alteration due to the loss of a tangential part.)
It also bears emphasis that if DPUP is accepted, we have another, independent motivation for accepting proposition 1-one that does not depend on mereological considerations. If DPUP is accepted, the truth of 1 is not just a matter of Tibbles and Tib having different proper parts. Rather, Tibbles and Tib are distinct at t because at t the latter does, but the former does not, exist-it is not actual. This is indicative of the wide scope of DPUP's consequences.
There is, however, a curious symmetry in the way of thinking about parts that underlies this doctrine. On the one hand, if a piece is still attached to a whole, it counts as a part thereof, not as an actual entity. On the other hand, when a piece is detached from the whole, it turns into an actual entity, but ceases to be a part. This may not be true in general, but it appears to hold for parts of continuants such as Tibbles, the cat. For, suppose the tail does not get destroyed in the accident. It is cut off, but not a single molecule of it suffers from the cut. (Nothing important hinges on the presumption that the boundary between Tib and Tail be perfectly sharp.) Then at t Tail is a 1-4 but deny that identity is transitive: this is the step taken e.g. by Garrett (1985) . (Geach 1967 and Noonan 1980 take identity to be relative to sortal terms, with similar results.) Alternatively, one could keep all of 1-4 and uphold transitivity by subscribing to a view of objects as four-dimensional hunks of matter, as in Heller (1984) . part of Tibbles, but it does not exist. At t' Tail exists, but it is no longer a part of Tibbles. (At best, at t' Tail is part of the mereological sum of Tib and Tail, both of which exist.) If this is correct, then we have another puzzle. For let '+' denote the operation of mereological sum. Then the following set of propositions is mutually inconsistent:
(one is a proper part of the other) 2'. Tib+Tail at t = Tib+Tail at t' (the sum is the same throughout) 3'. Tibbles at t = Tibbles at t' (Tibbles survives the loss of Tail) 4'. Tibbles at t = Tib+Tail at t (both have the same parts)
Again, the inconsistency follows by the transitivity of identity. Since 1' is true by Leibniz's law (at t', Tibbles and Tib+Tail have different shapes), one must give up one among 2', 3', and 4'. Again, to give up 4' is to abandon both the principle of mereological extensionality and the traditional identity criterion according to which two distinct material bodies cannot occupy the same spatial region at the same time, and to give up 3' is to accept a form of mereological essentialism. So again, if neither of these ways out is found palatable, we are left with 2'. This is not immediately comparable to proposition 2 in the earlier set, though again it seems to amount to a form of topological essentialism. To deny Tib+Tail's survival is to make Tib+ Tail's existence depend on the topological property of self-connectedness.
4
Indeed, if 4' is true (so that Tib+Tail exists at t), to give up 2' is to deny that Tib+Tail exists at t'. This, in turn, amounts to giving up the unrestricted principle of mereological fusion, to the effect that a sum always exists independently of the topological (or spatial at large) relationships between the parts. And in this case, there is no particular explanation that DPUP can offer to clarify the nature of this rejection. From the fact that undetached parts, such as Tib and Tail at t, are not actual entities it does of course not follow that their sum does not exist at t. And from the fact that the parts eventually get separated at t' it does not follow that the sum then ceases to exist. One needs an independent explanation for that. And nothing is available to the defender of DPUP that is not already available to the others. If this is accepted, then DPUP turns out to be much weaker than consideration of the first argument (1)-(4) would suggest. The explanation afforded by DPUP is local. Alternatively, DPUP must be strengthened by combining it with an explicit rejection of the fusion principle. This would make 1' true for a different reason than the one advertised. Namely, Tibbles and Tib+Tail would be distinct because the latter does not, whereas the former does, exist at t. This is perfectly analogous to the corresponding remark concerning 1. But then the Doctrine of Potential Undetached Parts turns into a Doctrine of Potential Disconnected Wholes. Disconnected wholes (i.e., wholes that are not in one piece) would not be actual entities. They would be merely potential entities, entities which would exist if they were put together in some suitable form. And this is a totally different story.
